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“Regulating E-Cigarettes: Why Policies Diverge”1
Eric A. Feldman, University of Pennsylvania Law School
Conference celebrating the work of Malcolm Feeley, October 2015

INTRODUCTION
From their origins in the laboratory of a Chinese pharmacist in 2003 to their
place in the portfolios of the world’s largest tobacco companies, electronic
cigarettes have emerged as one of the most popular and controversial products of
the 21st century. Some current smokers see e-cigarettes as offering an
opportunity to reduce their dependence on conventional combustible tobacco
products and instead make use of a potentially less dangerous substitute. Others,
particularly young non-smokers, embrace e-cigarettes because they offer a taste
of the unknown, a chance to assert independence by using a new product that
they see as edgy and experimental. Public health professionals are divided about
the health consequences of e-cigarettes, with some arguing that they will
perpetuate or even exacerbate the public health harms caused by conventional
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cigarettes and others claiming that they will reduce tobacco-related morbidity
and mortality. For many, e-cigarettes represent an attractive business
opportunity; from single-proprietor vaping shops in suburban malls to
multinational companies with global tobacco holdings, e-cigarettes have taken
root as an important new consumer product.
Faced with such diverse perspectives, what are regulators doing to control
the manufacture, sale, and use of e-cigarettes? The answer, perhaps surprising in
this age of supposed globalization, depends in large part upon where those
regulators are located. Public Health England (PHE), for example, has embraced
the e-cigarette, recently stating that “vaping is at least 95% less harmful than
smoking” and highlighting “the large difference in relative risk” between smoking
and vaping “so that more smokers are encouraged to make the switch”(McNeill et
al. 2018). PHE’s enthusiasm for e-cigarettes is reflected in the widespread use of
e-cigarettes in England, where 6% of the adult population are vapers, almost all of
whom are smokers or ex-smokers (McNeill et al. 2018, 14). In contrast, regulators
in 25 countries as diverse as the UAE, Brazil, Panama, and Singapore have banned
the sale and/or use of e-cigarettes (Kennedy et al. 2017) Where e-cigarettes are
not banned they are regulated in widely different ways, ranging from the

stringent imposition of pharmaceutical regulations to lax consumer product
controls (Ibid).
Although the texture of e-cigarette regulations is highly variable, it would
be an exaggeration to suggest that the forces of globalization are entirely absent.
The most significant example of transnational e-cigarette regulation is found in
the European Community, where the European Parliament approved a revision of
the Tobacco Products Directive (TPD) in 2014 (Directive (2014/40/EU). The revised
TPD, which came into force in May 2016, applies many pre-existing tobacco
control policies to e-cigarettes, such as banning advertising, requiring child-proof
packaging, and including packet health warnings. In addition, it includes
regulations specific to e-cigarettes, such as setting the maximum size of ecigarette refill containers (10ml), the maximum concentration of nicotine in eliquid (20 mg/ml), the maximum size of liquid tanks (2ml), and requirements that
e-cigarettes use liquids “that do not pose a risk to human health in heated or
unheated form,” that “electronic cigarettes deliver the nicotine doses at
consistent levels,” and that the packaging include a detailed list of ingredients.
Even within the EU, however, policy differences remain, and beyond the EU
the regulation of e-cigarettes varies dramatically across borders. What explains
the divergence of e-cigarette policies globally? Why haven’t we seen the

opposite—general convergence of laws and regulations governing the sale and
use of e-cigarettes?
This paper explores the landscape of e-cigarette policy globally by looking
at three jurisdictions that have taken starkly different approaches to regulating ecigarettes—the US, Japan, and China. Each of those countries has a robust
tobacco industry, government agencies entrusted with protecting public health,
an active and sophisticated scientific and medical community, and a regulatory
structure for managing new pharmaceutical, tobacco, and consumer products. All
three are signatories of the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (United Nations 2003),2 all are signatories of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS
Agreement) (World Intellectual Property Organization n.d.), and all are members
of the World Trade Organization (World Trade Organization, Understanding n.d.).
Which legal, economic, social and political differences between the three
countries explain their diverse approaches to regulating e-cigarettes? Why have
they embraced such dramatically different postures toward e-cigarettes?
Although Malcolm has not (yet!) studied e-cigarettes, this paper builds on
his legacy in several ways. First, a great deal of Malcolm’s work is explicitly or
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implicitly comparative. He is always thinking about the full spectrum of possible
answers to the questions he poses; considering cross-border similarities and
differences between legal institutions; questioning assumptions about how
politics, economics, law, and society interact; and probing to see how different
institutional configurations might lead to different legal outcomes. E-cigarette
regulation invites exactly that type of analysis. What differentiates policy
approaches to e-cigarettes has little to do with science or with the nature of ecigarette devices. Instead, the differences are institutional, political, economic,
sociological, legal. In that way, e-cigarette regulation provides a window through
which to examine the foundation, and the operation, of different legal systems –
Malcolm’s stock and trade.
This paper also owes a debt to Malcolm’s work on complex policy choices,
in which he undertakes an almost surgical dismantling of policy options. He would
surely relish the opportunity to put the full set of e-cigarette regulatory options
on the operating table and use his analytical scalpel to demonstrate their costs
and benefits. Third, Malcolm is a brilliant theorist, but I have always been even
more impressed by his commitment to the law in action, and particularly by his
focus on the impact of legal rules and practices on those who are less fortunate.
E-cigarettes invite exactly that set of concerns; at root, the issues raised by e-

cigarettes implicate basic questions of values and social justice, and the degree to
which e-cigarettes might exacerbate or alleviate the disproportionate harm
combustible tobacco imposes on those with less education and income.

E-CIGARETTE POLICY: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE
Over the past several decades the idea of policy convergence has garnered
increasing attention among legal scholars, political scientists, scholars of
international relations, and others, who have identified specific regulated
activities in which policies converge and theorized the how(s) and why(s) of
convergence (Linos 2013; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006).3 This paper takes
a different approach. It highlights a concrete policy question—whether and how
to regulate electronic cigarettes—and asks why the regulatory paths followed in
three countries have led one to treat e-cigarettes as tobacco products (the US),
another as pharmaceutical products (Japan), and a third as ordinary consumer
products (China). Scientific and epidemiological data about e-cigarettes travels
easily across borders; public health officials in those countries have multiple
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points of connection; political leaders have a shared interest in limiting
unnecessary health risks and avoiding unnecessary expenditures; for those and
other reasons, convergence rather than divergence would appear to be the most
likely policy outcome. Why, then, have the United States, Japan, and China –each
of which is home to one of the world’s most successful tobacco companies, has a
large segment of the population that suffers from tobacco-related diseases, and
spends billions of dollars caring for people whose deaths are preventable-followed such different paths?
There is, of course, a short and simple answer. Policies in the US, Japan, and
China frequently diverge, be it trade policy, tax policy, health care policy, and
more (KPMG 2015).4 The three nations are differently situated economically,
diplomatically, politically, and culturally, and those differences generate different
policy preferences. Indeed, one might argue that policy convergence in the area
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of e-cigarettes, not policy divergence, would be the greater surprise. But to do so
would ignore the burgeoning literature on globalization and policy convergence,
which makes a compelling argument for why there should be at least some
degree of e-cigarette policy convergence in the US, Japan, and China (Linos 2013;
Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006; Fullerton and Alvarez 2012; Scherer 1997).5
Recent scholarship on cross-border cooperation and global networks in the
area of finance, for example, like Terry Halliday and Greg Shaffer’s Transnational
Legal Orders, highlights the growth of powerful transnational financial
institutions. Halliday and Shaffer argue that the influence of cross-border financial
institutions has muted the differences between national regulatory approaches
and increased the degree to which they overlap. Countries across the globe, in
their view, when confronted by similar policy questions, deploy common
regulatory strategies and construct similar regulatory institutions (Halliday and
Shaffer 2016).
Anne-Marie Slaughter’s A New World Order offers a related set of
arguments about the increasing amount of policy commonality among the world’s
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nations. She highlights the importance of global networks—judges, legislators, the
police, bankers, ministers, trade officials, and others—and argues that they have
become critically important actors in the shaping of both national and global
policy.6 Hers is a vision of governance that has its locus not in unitary state action
but in the simultaneous interaction of multiple networks, which negotiate and
influence each other as they address common problems (Slaughter 2005, 5).
Viewed through this lens, one should expect e-cigarette policy to be shaped not
by isolated nation-states but through the cross-border interaction of public health
experts, tobacco and pharmaceutical company executives; government officials
specializing in finance, health, and drugs; legislators; and more. Such interaction
would presumably lead to a set of policy outcomes that share at least some key
features, not outcomes that are fundamentally at odds.
One network of actors with a strong interest in e-cigarette regulation is
made up of scientists, epidemiologists, and other public health experts and
policymakers whose work involves the collection and interpretation of data about
the health impact of e-cigarettes. The network is relatively small and tightly knit;
many members train at the same schools, attend the same conferences, read and
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publish in the same journals, and are invited to the same international meetings
at the WHO and elsewhere. Network members also share a common goal,
reflective of the public health field more generally—to limit preventable illness
and death. Given those circumstances, one might expect similar, if not identical,
epidemiological findings and policy prescriptions for managing e-cigarettes to
emerge from such a group.
Despite the various reasons for expecting some degree of e-cigarette policy
convergence, it is difficult, at least so far, to find any evidence of such
convergence. Instead, e-cigarette regulations in the US, Japan, and China have
taken dramatically different forms. Three factors help to explain why.
First, some degree of scientific consensus, which is often a necessary
(though rarely a sufficient) condition for policy convergence, is missing. Although
scientists around the world are studying the health consequences of e-cigarettes
on users and bystanders, even basic scientific and epidemiological agreement is
lacking. To what extent do e-cigarettes imperil the health of those who use them?
How risky is the secondhand vapor of e-cigarettes to children and other
bystanders? Does the use of e-cigarettes among youth make it more likely that
they will become smokers of combustible tobacco? As will be discussed in more
detail below, the honest response to all of these questions is “we don’t know.”

Consequently, policy makers are relatively unconstrained by the data; they can
advocate a wide variety of policy approaches, all of which are defensible in light
of current scientific uncertainty.
Second, economic and political interests are rarely divorced from policy
outcomes, and in the area of e-cigarettes those interests are particularly
pronounced. In the US, for example, the growth, manufacture, and sale of
tobacco products has been left to the corporate sector, which evaded substantial
regulation by the federal government until 2009. In contrast, the Japanese
government created a monopoly in the early 20th century that controlled all
aspects of the tobacco business. The monopoly was turned into a publicly traded
company, Japan Tobacco, Inc., in 1985, but even today the Ministry of Finance
continues to hold one third of its stock. The Chinese central government also has
a tobacco monopoly (the China National Tobacco Corporation, or CNTC), but
unlike Japan there has not been a move toward privatization. It is the world’s
largest manufacturer of cigarettes in a country that consumes approximately 30%
of the world’s tobacco products, and is a critical source of revenue for the central
government. In each of the three countries, the distinctive institutional
configuration and financial interests of the tobacco sector have powerfully
influenced e-cigarette policy, and help to explain their divergent approaches.

Third, although the role and prominence of courts as policymaking bodies
clearly differs across borders, courts are not often highlighted as an explanation
for policy divergence. When it comes to e-cigarettes, however, litigation and
judicial decisions have been active components of policymaking in the US,
whereas in both Japan and China the courts have been silent. Indeed, were it not
for litigation over e-cigarette regulation in the US, the government’s approach to
e-cigarettes would look much more like Japan’s. This is not to suggest that courts
in the US are engaged in inappropriate judicial activism, but simply to point out
that interested parties in the US quickly turned to the courts to adjudicate
different perspectives on how e-cigarettes should be regulated, and the courts
obliged by issuing judgments that have fundamentally shaped government
regulation. Each of these three factors will be discussed in greater detail below.

E-CIGARETTES: TECHNOLOGY, USE, AND IMPACT ON HEALTH
A. What is an Electronic Cigarette?
Before regulating any product, regulators must describe and define what it
is they are regulating. For e-cigarettes, that turns out to be extremely difficult

(Lempert, Grana, and Glantz 2014).7 The first e-cigarettes to reach the market,
and the ones that are most visually similar to combustible cigarettes, are known
as cig-a-likes because they have the shape, look, and feel of a conventional
cigarette. Manufacturers quickly realized that cig-a-likes had an important
downside—by mimicking the aesthetic of cigarettes, consumers sensibly
associated them with cigarettes. For many consumers that was a negative
association, given the well-known health risks of smoking and the pejorative
moral undertones of doing so. Indeed, many e-cigarette users are keen to
distinguish themselves from smokers and disassociate their devices from
conventional cigarettes.8
As a result, a plethora of other products now use a similar technology to
cig-a-likes but take a different form. Those products, collectively known as
vaporizers and sometimes called vaping pens, e-hookahs, and more, can take a
variety of forms (Mistic E Cigs 2015).9 Some are rectangular, others look like
skulls, a particularly popular device (Juul) is shaped like a USB drive, and a few
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appear to have come out of Apple’s creative department, with slick and appealing
contours and colors. The market for vaporizers has expanded rapidly and the
devices have changed apace, with some of the newest products featuring options
like adjustable wattage, which allows consumers to change the amount of vapor
inhaled from each puff.
Despite their aesthetic differences, all e-cigarettes are based on a common
technology. They include a rechargeable battery, a liquid (or in a few cases a
chamber that can be filled with leaf) that generally contains nicotine, an atomizer
that converts liquid into vapor, an LED light to simulate a burning cigarette, and a
computer chip that senses inhalation and triggers the atomizer. Some e-cigarettes
come prepackaged with a liquid-filled container and are discarded when all of the
liquid is vaporized. Others operate on the same principle as Nescafe coffee
machines; a reusable device that is recharged with disposable pods. Still others
contain liquid chambers that can be refilled by consumers with whatever e-liquid
they prefer, or vaporize leaf tobacco rather than liquid.
One factor that makes it difficult to regulate e-cigarettes, therefore, is the
rapidity with which the technology has, and continues to, evolve. The question
‘what is an e-cigarette’ does not have a simple or clear answer, and without a
crisp definition of an e-cigarette regulators have struggled to develop a regulatory

strategy. Japanese officials in the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, for
example, have stated that they are not able to specify the meaning of ‘ecigarette,’ and as a result they worry about the coherence of e-cigarette
regulation (MHLW officials, personal communication with author, December
2014.).
B. How Popular are E-Cigarettes?
While the US e-cigarette market is still modest in comparison to the $94
billion in annual sales of combustible cigarettes, some analysts, like Bonnie
Herzog at Wells Fargo, have predicted that over the next two decades the market
for e-cigarettes may surpass that for combustible cigarettes (Euromonitor
International 2017; NACS 2013). Overall, electronic cigarette sales in the US have
been increasing rapidly, from just $20 million in 2008 to an estimated $5.5 billion
in 2018. The global market for e-cigarettes has also exploded, andis projected to
growa at least 20% annually, reaching an estimated $48 billion by 2023 (Business
Wire, 2018). Retail outlets for e-cigarettes have also proliferated. Just a few years
ago there were no specialty vaping stores. Today, every major city in the US has
dozens, often hundreds, of such shops, which in total numbered over 15,000 in
2015 (Mincer 2015). Those shops are frequented by the ever-increasing number
of vapers.. Although estimates vary, the Centers for Disease Control and

Prevention (CDC) in 2016 reported that 15.4% of adults aged 18 years of age or
older had tried e-cigarettes, and 11.3% of high school students had used ecigarettes in the past 30 days (CDC 2017; CDC 2018). In Japan, because of strict
regulation (see below), vaping is almost nonexistent. Data on e-cigarette use in
China is spotty, but since 2013 China’s domestic e-cigarette market has grown
quickly, with knowledgeable insiders claiming that over the next 5 to 10 years the
market will increase by more than 30% annually, and in the coming decades will
overtake conventional combustible cigarettes (Feldman and Yue 2016; People
2014).
C. Are E-Cigarettes Harmful?
Not only is it difficult to identify the key qualities and market size of ecigarettes; it is also challenging to determine whether e-cigarettes will ultimately
harm or enhance public health. A growing number of researchers globally are
studying the health consequences of vaping, particularly: What is the impact of
vaping on the health of vapers? Does vaping harm the heath of bystanders? Will
e-cigarettes substitute for, or be used in addition to, combustible cigarettes? How
popular will e-cigarettes be among people below the age of 18? Are the chemicals
used to flavor e-liquid harmful? Will e-cigarettes be an effective harm reduction
device for those who want to quit smoking? Might e-cigarettes create an

atmosphere of public tolerance toward vaping that risks ‘re-normalizing’ the use
of combustible cigarettes?
Because data collection and analysis will take many years, at this point it is
impossible to accurately answer any of the key questions involving e-cigarettes
and health. Surely there are reasons for both optimism and concern. If ecigarettes are capturing the interest of youth, for example, who first vape and
then turn to combustible cigarettes, long-running declines in tobacco
consumption could level off or be reversed. If current smokers turn to e-cigarettes
to supplement but not substitute for cigarette consumption, then e-cigarettes
might be reducing the number of people who quit smoking. If certain components
of e-cigarettes, perhaps contained in e-liquid base ingredients or flavorings, turn
out to be harmful, then e-cigarettes could be ushering in a new era of cancers and
other diseases. On the other hand, e-cigarettes might be helping current smokers
quit, keeping youth from initiating smoking, and playing a key role in reducing
tobacco-related morbidity and mortality.
Scientific uncertainty appears to have heightened the tenor of the debate
between those who see little but danger in e-cigarettes and those who embrace

them as the centerpiece of a harm reduction strategy. .11 Stanton Glantz, for
example, who runs the Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education at the
University of California, San Francisco, argues that his research demonstrates that
“among youth who had experimented with cigarettes but had not progressed to
established smoking, additional use of e-cigarettes was positively associated with
future onset of current established smoking (Chaffee, Watkins, and Glantz
2018).” Thomas Glynn of the American Cancer Society offers a different
interpretation, arguing that “[t]he data in [Glantz’s] study do not allow many of
the broad conclusions that it draws.” Glynn, in a review of e-cigarettes, expanded
upon his view.
“If, at some point in the very near future, the preponderance of objective
data show e-cigarettes to be demonstrably unsafe and/or ineffective, we
will want to move on to other approaches that can lower the appalling toll
from cigarette smoking. Or, in a similarly abbreviated time span, if objective
data demonstrate their safety compared with combusted cigarettes and
their effectiveness compared with current treatment approaches for
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tobacco dependence, then smokers can add e-cigarettes to the menu of
options they can use to end their combusted cigarette habit and extend
their lives (Glynn 2014).”
If Glantz represents the critical end of the spectrum of views about the
health impact of e-cigarettes, and Glynn is positioned in the middle, other
respected scientists have a decidedly positive view of e-cigarettes. David Abrams,
the Executive Director of the Schroeder Institute for Tobacco Research and Policy
Studies at the Legacy Foundation, is perhaps the most prominent example.
Abrams is enthusiastic about the potential of e-cigarettes to greatly reduce
tobacco-related morbidity and mortality, arguing that ”if most current American
smokers switched to vaping e-cigarettes over the next 10 years, there could be as
many as 6.6 million fewer premature deaths and 86.7 million fewer life years
would be lost (New York University 2018).”
For now, the weight of objective, professional opinion favors the middle
ground. As the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has stated,
“E-cigarettes have not been fully studied, so consumers currently don’t know the
potential risks of e-cigarettes when used as intended, how much nicotine or other
potentially harmful chemicals are being inhaled during use, or whether there are
any benefits associated with using these products. Additionally, it is not known

whether e-cigarettes may lead young people to try other tobacco products,
including conventional cigarettes, which are known to cause disease and lead to
premature death (U.S. Food and Drug Administration 2017).” Similarly, an August
2015 report of the US National Institutes of Health notes that e-cigarettes “have
not been thoroughly evaluated in scientific studies. This may change in the near
future, but for now, very little data exists on the safety of e-cigarettes, and
consumers have no way of knowing whether there are any therapeutic benefits or
how the health effects compare to conventional cigarettes (National Institute on
Drug Abuse 2017).” That finding was echoed in an authoritative review conducted
by the National Academies, which concluded that “e-cigarettes cannot be simply
categorized as either beneficial or harmful to health. The net public health
outcome depends on the balance between adverse outcomes (increased youth
initiation of combustible tobacco cigarettes, low or even decreased cessation
rates in adults, and a high-risk profile) and positive outcomes (very low youth
initiation, high cessation rates in adults, and a low-risk profile) (National
Academies 2018)”.
In contrast to the uncertainty about e-cigarettes expressed by government
officials in the US, policymakers in England have been far more enthusiastic. .
Public Health England, for example, has vigorously embraced e-cigarettes,

declaring that “vaping poses only a small fraction of the risks of smoking and
switching completely from smoking to vaping conveys substantial health benefits
over continued smoking (McNeill et al. 2018).” In contrast, although China
manufacturers over 90% of the world’s electronic cigarettes, there have been no
Chinese studies on the health consequences of vaping, and the government has
devoted scant energy to studying the impact of e-cigarettes on youth, on current
smokers (of which China has more than any other country in the world), or on
bystanders (Feldman and Yue 2016). In Japan, one finds a similar cleavage
between public health researchers as in the US. Some experts, like those working
at the National Cancer Center in Tokyo, express strong reservations about the
safety of e-cigarettes, whereas others, particularly those based in Osaka, have
endorsed e-cigarettes as an effective harm reduction technology ( Personal
communication with author).
Public health policy rarely rests on a bed of scientific certainty. But the wide
range of views among experts about the safety of e-cigarettes goes well beyond
the usual lack of consensus. Some researchers consider e-cigarettes themselves to
be harmful, or believe that e-cigarettes will encourage the use of combustible
tobacco and insist that they be banned or aggressively regulated. Others conclude
that e-cigarettes are an effective harm reduction tool, and should be made

available to the many people for whom they could provide a benefit. These
opposing policy options, both lacking strong empirical support, help to explain the
lack of policy convergence in the regulation of e-cigarettes. Faced with an array of
policy options and little scientific support for any particular policy outcome,
policymakers have instead based their policy choices on other factors—political
pressure, financial opportunities and constraints, their perception of the public
good, and more. One can see the result of the lack of scientific consensus in the
current e-cigarette policies of the US, Japan, and China. In the US, the FDA has
moved haltingly toward e-cigarette regulation; after an initial effort to regulate ecigarettes as pharmaceutical products was challenged in court, the agency
decided to treat them as tobacco products, but has so far failed to issue specific
regulations. Various municipalities, cities, and states have developed their own ecigarette policies, most of which fold e-cigarettes into existing tobacco control
law.
Compared to the absence of national policy in the US, Japan has followed a
much more aggressive path. Policy makers in the Ministry of Health, Labor, and
Welfare have concluded that the nicotine in e-cigarettes is a drug, meaning that
e-cigarettes fall under the umbrella of pharmaceutical regulation.12 To market
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E-cigarettes that do not contain nicotine are not affected by the regulations.

their products, manufacturers of e-cigarettes are therefore required to submit
data to the Ministry demonstrating that their products are both safe and
effective. Since they currently have no such data, nicotine-containing e-cigarettes
cannot be marketed. Japan’s de facto e-cigarette ban stands in stark contrast to
the Chinese government’s approach. There, health officials, finance officials,
pharmaceutical regulators, and others have seemingly ignored the debate over ecigarettes in the US, Europe, Japan, and elsewhere, and have allowed e-cigarettes
to be manufactured, sold, and consumed in a regulatory vacuum.
In an era when scholars so often see policy convergence as the norm, the
inconsistency one finds in e-cigarette policy is notable.13 The absence of robust
scientific data about the health impact of e-cigarettes is critical to explaining that
inconsistency. Freed from the constraints of robust epidemiological and scientific
findings, policymakers in the US, Japan, and China have adopted three
dramatically different approaches to e-cigarette regulation, ranging from the de
facto prohibition of e-cigarettes to a highly permissive, unregulated posture. But
science is not the only factor that explains regulatory divergence. The political and
economic forces that have shaped tobacco policy in different nations are also a
crucial part of the explanation.
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See supra N.3 for a small sample of the literature on policy convergence.

LAW, POLITICS, AND MARKETS: THE IMPACT OF TOBACCO POLICY ON ECIGARETTE REGULATION
When e-cigarettes entered the global marketplace in 2003, they did so
against a background that was etched by over a century of conflict over tobacco
regulation. In the US, industrialists in the early 20th century worked hard to ensure
that tobacco products escaped government control (Kluger 1997; Brandt 2009).
They used their growing wealth—soon, they would be among the largest
companies in the US, and the world—to influence local politicians, hire prominent
law firms, and recruit top advertising agencies, and for over a century succeeded
in minimizing the regulation of combustible tobacco products. The FDA, created in
1927 as the Food, Drug and Insecticide Administration and renamed in 1930, had
no jurisdiction over tobacco, so federal regulation came primarily from the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which in 1966 imposed limits on tobacco
advertising and required warnings on cigarette packets (U.S. Food and Drug
Administration 2018; Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1966).
Over time, states and municipalities picked up some of the regulatory slack, and
by the late 20th century had developed a web of clean air and workplace
restrictions.

Calls for more government regulation of tobacco started early in the 20th
century, but it was not until the publication of the Surgeon General’s 1964 Report
“Smoking and Health,” which clearly identified smoking as a cause of lung cancer,
that tobacco control advocates had a firm scientific footing (U.S. Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare 1964). The report catalyzed the emergence of a
powerful tobacco control movement, triggered a long, steady decline in tobacco
consumption, and ushered in a half century of tort litigation brought by smokers
who accused the industry of acting negligently and defective products. Most of
their claims failed, but they spawned additional lawsuits against the industry by
state and federal government (Rabin 1991-1992; Rabin 2001). In 2009, Congress
granted the FDA authority to regulate tobacco products, and some optimistic
tobacco control advocates declared that ‘the end of tobacco’ was at hand
(Tobacco Control 2013; Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
2009).14
At least initially, e-cigarette companies have little in common with their 20th
century predecessors. The industry, if one can call it that, was made up of
individual entrepreneurs who imported small quantities of merchandise from e-
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Tobacco control, special issue on tobacco endgame; Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act,
H.R.1256, Public Law 111-31, June 22, 2009. It is the 2009 law that the FDA is using to assert regulatory authority
over e-cigarettes.

cigarette manufacturers in China, and sold it either online or in small shops. As
the popularity of e-cigarettes increased, however, the nature of the e-cigarette
business quickly changed, and what was originally a niche product is now a
multibillion-dollar global industry controlled by some of the world’s richest
companies. Lorillard, for example, purchased the US market-leading e-cigarette,
Blu, for $135 million in 2012 and sold it in 2014 (along with several of its tobacco
brands) to Imperial Tobacco in a $7.1 billion deal (Solomon 2014).15 Altria Group,
the parent company of Philip Morris, joined with its international spinoff, Philip
Morris International, to develop and market MarkTen, Green Smoke, and iQOS,
and in 2014 purchased UK e-cigarette company Nicocigs. R.J. Reynold’s popular ecigarette, Vuse, was released in 2014, and for a while controlled almost 1/3 of
the US market (Craver 2015). British American Tobacco developed and markets
Vype. Japan Tobacco Inc. first acquired UK-based E-Lites and later purchased
Logic, a major US e-cigarette brand (JTI 2014; JTI 2015).16 A notable exception to
the dominance of global tobacco brands is Pax Labs, originally founded in 2007 as
Ploom, which developed a novel e-cigarette product called Juul in 2015 and
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The sale to Imperial was part of deal in which Reynolds American bought Lorillard for $27.4 billion.
http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2014/07/15/reynolds-lorillard-dump-blu-e-cigarettes-in-27-billionmerger/#4849ab5bd1c6.
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Japan Tobacco also owns a minority interest in Ploom, a California-based leaf vaporizer.

founded a new company, Juul Labs, in 2017. Sales of Juul increased more than
600% in 2017, and by mid-2018 Juul accounted for over 60% of all e-cigarette
sales in the US (Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids 2018).
Collectively, these companies bring to e-cigarettes an extraordinary amount
of wealth, market savvy, and regulatory experience. They have pumped
significant resources into marketing and advertising, carefully avoiding claims
about the intended use of their products (claiming that e-cigarettes are intended
to help smokers quit, for example, invites regulation as a smoking cessation
device, which brings them under the ambit of pharmaceutical regulators). They
hire top law firms that provide expert corporate advice and litigation defense.
And they have teams of lobbyists who know how to work the corridors of power
and influence regulators. Globally, e-cigarette regulators must contend with
companies that successfully evaded government regulation for most of the 20th
century.
The key forces at play in US tobacco regulation have greatly influenced the
regulation of e-cigarettes. First, the tobacco industry consists of a number of
private companies, some of which have grown into the world’s most robust
multinational corporations. Those corporations now control the US e-cigarette
industry. Second, tobacco companies have worked hard and spent aggressively to

protect themselves from regulation, and are doing the same to fend off and/or
shape e-cigarette regulation. Third, for over a century the government has taken
a relatively hands-off approach to tobacco regulation, which has changed only
since the enactment of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act in
2009. But that Act only allows the FDA to regulate certain enumerated tobacco
products, not including e-cigarettes. So the FDA is engaged in a lengthy effort to
‘deem’ e-cigarettes as tobacco products under the Act (Deeming Tobacco
Products To Be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as Amended
by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (Proposed Rule) 2015;
FDA 2011).17 Fourth, a combination of municipal, state, and federal regulations
now restrict the sale and use of tobacco in a variety of ways: only adults can
purchase tobacco products, such products can only be used in certain places,
advertising tobacco products is restricted, tobacco is subject to various types of
taxation, and more. As a matter of convenience if not coherence, e-cigarettes
have in some places been folded into those laws. Fifth, the tobacco control
community consistently presses for further regulation of tobacco that will
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Deeming Tobacco Products To Be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as Amended by the
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (Proposed Rule), FDA (Aug. 8, 2015)
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/EconomicAnalyses/ucm394922.htm (detailing
efforts by the FDA to promulgate regulations that would give the FDA authority to regulate e-cigarettes);
Stakeholder Letter: Regulation of E-Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Apr. 25, 2011),
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus/ucm252360.htm (describing the FDA’s intent to extend its
authority to regulate e-cigarettes under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009).

improve public health. But it is divided as to how best to manage e-cigarettes,
because there is broad disagreement as to whether e-cigarettes are more or a
threat or an asset to public health. In short, the spectrum of economic and
political interests that shaped US tobacco policy are now defining US e-cigarette
policy.
The key institutions and interests at play in the US are dramatically
different from those that characterize the economic and political framework of
tobacco regulation in Japan. In the late 19th century the Japanese government
took control of tobacco leaf cultivation through the Leaf Tobacco Monopoly Law,
and the 1904 Tobacco Monopoly Law completed the state’s monopolization of
the cultivation, manufacture, and sale of tobacco products (Executory Order and
Reasons for a Tobacco Manufacturing Monopoly 1991).18 Creating a tobacco
monopoly brought a number of benefits to the government. One was that it
facilitated the collection of tobacco-related taxes, which initially helped to fund
the Russo-Japanese War and ultimately constituted a significant portion of the
country’s total tax revenue (Rothacher 1989; Honjo and Kawachi 2000)19 In
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For a detailed official history of the tobacco monopoly, see Tabako Senbaishi, [A History of the Tobacco
Monopoly], Nihon Tabako Sangyō K.K. Shashi Hensan-shitsu, 6th ed., 1991, volumes 1-6.
19
At one point tobacco constituted 18% of total government tax-related revenue, a figure that had declined to 12% today. Albrecht Rothacher, Japan’s Agro-Food Sector: The Politics and Economics of Excess Protection, London:
MacMillan, 1989, 87. See also, Kaori Honjo and Ichiro Kawachi, “Effects of Market Liberalization on Smoking in
Japan,” Tobacco Control, vol. 9, 193-200, 2000, 193.

addition, and in what foreshadowed tobacco-related trade conflict between the
US and Japan in the 1980s, the government worried about the increasing
prominence of the US tobacco industry and its impact on the health of its
domestic tobacco market (Levin 1997; Executory Order and Reasons for a
Tobacco Manufacturing Monopoly 1991, 7).20 A tobacco monopoly, in the
government’s view, was the best way to protect its domestic interests.
There was a third benefit of the tobacco monopoly; it created a set of
institutional relationships that continue to serve the needs of key tobacco policy
players—the state, tobacco growers, and Japan’s dominant political party (the
Liberal Democratic Party, or LDP). In the context of tobacco policy, the most
significant government actor is the Ministry of Finance (MoF), which oversaw the
monopoly until 1985 and continues to be the locus of the government’s tobacco
strategy. MoF told tobacco farmers how much land they could cultivate and how
many plants they could grow. It owned and operated cigarette factories
throughout the country. It licensed tobacco retailers, and set the price of tobacco
products. After 1985, when the tobacco monopoly was eliminated, MoF
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See, for example, Executory Order and Reasons for a Tobacco Manufacturing Monopoly (Tabako seizō sembai
seido riyū oyobi shikō junjo), quoted in Tabako Sembai-shi [A History of the Tobacco Monopoly], Nihon Tabako
Sangyō K.K. Shashi Hensan-shitsu, 6th ed., 1991, volume 1, p.7, translated and discussed in Mark Levin’s detailed
article about Japanese tobacco regulation, “Smoke Around the Rising Sun: An American Look at Tobacco
Regulation in Japan,” Stanford Journal of Law and Policy 8(1), 99-123, 1997.

continued to be the controlling shareholder in Japan’s only tobacco company,
Japan Tobacco (JT), and it (not the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare) makes
all important tobacco policy decisions.
Tobacco growers appear to have flourished under this scheme. They were
guaranteed a buyer for all of their tobacco leaf, and received a generous price for
their crops. In exchange, they were loyal to their patrons by showing up at the
voting booth and supporting the LDP. The disproportionate weight accorded to
rural votes in Japan made the support of tobacco farmers (and agriculture more
generally) particularly valuable. Japan Tobacco, Japan’s sole tobacco company,
was also a beneficiary of the system. For many years JT was the sole purveyor of
tobacco products in Japan, and it continues to be protected from undue foreign
competition. The high post-war rate of tobacco consumption in Japan brought
significant revenue to MoF and JT, and JT’s international division, Japan Tobacco
International (JTI), is now a major global tobacco player.
When e-cigarettes appeared in Japan in the early 2000s, everyone could
easily evaluate their preferred policy outcomes. JT had not yet invested in the ecigarette business, so keeping the domestic market free of competition was a
priority. From MoF’s perspective, the decline in tobacco consumption in Japan
since the 1970s had resulted in decreasing tobacco-related government revenue,

and a further decline caused by Japanese cigarette smokers switching to foreign
e-cigarettes was undesirable (Funatogawa, Funatogawa, and Tano 2013). For
health regulators at the MHLW, long excluded from tobacco regulation by MoF, ecigarettes were an opportunity to extend their regulatory turf. Tobacco growers,
retailers, and others in the industry could not have welcomed competition from
e-cigarettes, and members of the LDP had little to gain from a policy that opened
the Japanese market to e-cigarettes. In short, the political and economic interests
of the key players leaned clearly against a liberal regulatory posture for ecigarettes. By deciding that e-cigarettes were not tobacco products and would
instead be regulated under the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law, MHLW and MoF
effectively kept nicotine-containing e-cigarettes out of Japan.21
Like Japan, China also has a long history of tobacco cultivation and
consumption. The commercialized growth of tobacco started in the 16th century,
and by the 1750s tobacco had become an important source of revenue for both
central and local government (Benedict 2011, 2). In 1981 China created a state
tobacco monopoly controlled by an agency with two parts; the State Tobacco
Monopoly Administration (STMA), charged with regulating and monitoring the
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In contrast, the Japanese government permits the sale of so-called heat-not-burn products, which use a
vaporizing technology similar to e-cigarettes but contain processed leaf tobacco rather than liquid. Such products
fit the government’s definition of ‘tobacco products,’ and therefore have been folded into the preexisting
regulatory framework for combustible cigarettes.

tobacco industry, and China National Tobacco Company (CNTC), tasked with the
production, procurement, processing, and pricing of tobacco leaf and the
marketing of cigarettes (Li 2012, 82).
With 300 million smokers (25% of all smokers globally) who consume 40%
of the world’s cigarettes, the political, economic, and health impacts of tobacco in
China are enormous (Li 2012, ix).22 The most significant issue is revenue; as Chart
1 demonstrates, the tobacco industry is a cash cow, even in China’s rapidly
expanding economy, and tobacco-related taxes are critical to the state’s coffers
(Baojiang 2010; Li 2012, x; USDA and FAS 2000).23 The tobacco sector is also a
major employer, providing jobs for more than 500,000 people, with an additional
20 million deriving some income from tobacco, including 1.3 million farming
households and 5 million retail workers (Martin 2014).

Chart 1: Assets, Revenue and Profit of China’s Tobacco Processing and
Manufacturing Industries (1985-2009)
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Ibid, p.ix. China’s total cigarette production is approximately four times greater than the United States, the
world’s second largest tobacco-producing country.
23
Li Baojiang, “Effects of increasing tobacco taxes on government revenue and consumption in China,”Acta
Tabacaria Sinica, October 2010, Vol. 16 No. 5. The central government collects a tobacco excise tax, a value-added
tax and a certain amount of net profit from the China National Tobacco Corporation. Tobacco taxes combined with
profit constituted over 6% of total government income in 2014, and considerably more in previous years. (“Over
the past decade, the tobacco industry has consistently contributed 7-10 percent of total annual central
government revenues, similar to a number of lucrative and fast-growing sectors such as real estate and
petroleum.” Cheng Li, The Political Mapping of China’s Tobacco Industry and Anti-Smoking Campaign, Brookings,
2012, x.) See also Global Agriculture Information Network, United States Department of Agriculture, “Peoples
Republic of China, Tobacco and Products, Tobacco Update 2000,” GAIN Report #CH0044, 1, which states that China
derives 10% of its total tax revenue from tobacco.

Source: Li 2012, 89.

The economic importance of tobacco is underscored by the regulatory power of
the State Tobacco Monopoly Administration (STMA), which through the China
National Tobacco Corporation (CNTC) controls the Chinese cigarette industry. The
CNTC oversees tobacco growth, production, sales, human resources, finance,
marketing, and trade, and includes 33 provincial subsidiaries (Tobacco Monopoly
Administrations) and a multitude of industrial and commercial enterprises. At the
regional level, a tobacco leaf tax (20%) flows directly to local government,
together with 25% of the national value-added tax. In provinces like Yunnan and
Guizhou, the epicenters of China’s tobacco production, tobacco is the “pillar of
the economy (Li 2012).”

Superficially, the Chinese government has made tobacco control a policy
priority. It signed and ratified the WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control, and in 2007 the State Council established the "FCTC Implementation
Inter-Ministerial Coordination Leading Group," with members from a spectrum of
relevant ministries (World Health Organization n.d.). That group has discussed the
possibility of prohibiting tobacco advertising in the mass media, banning tobacco
use in indoor public places, and forbidding sales to minors.24 More recently, the
China Tobacco Control Plan proposed measures like prohibiting smoking in public
places, strengthening warnings on cigarette packets, and banning tobacco
promotion and sponsorship (Feldman and Yue 2016).
Nonetheless, the political and economic importance of tobacco in China
ensures that tobacco control policy will remain weak and ineffective (Hong 2014;
Lv, Su, Hong 2011; Li 2012, x). Per capita smoking rates are high, second-hand
smoke exposure is ubiquitous, youth access is widespread, and public education is
poor. Rather than limit per capita tobacco consumption, CNTC’s goal is to improve
tobacco sales and profits. As a distinguished scholar of Chinese politics puts it,
24

The Smoking Control Ordinance of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone focused on strengthening the enforcement
of smoking-bans in public places. It created six municipal agencies; Public Security Bureau, Urban Management
Bureau, Transportation Commission, Health Supervision Bureau, Sports and Tourism Bureau and Market
Supervision Bureau, responsible for enforcing the Ordinance in their own domains. From March 1 to December 31
2014, 100,253 public places were inspected and 8,675 people were administratively fined a total of ￥420,100.
Shenzhen, where the most aggressive smoking regulations were implemented in 2014, is seen as a model tobacco
control city in China.

Despite growing public concern over the smoking epidemic’s severe health
consequences, as well as the massive long-term economic burden it
presents, Chinese authorities have been slow to acknowledge this
increasingly devastating public health crisis. Their hesitance to effectively
curtail tobacco production and consumption is driven primarily by the fact
that the tobacco industry is one of the largest sources of tax revenue for
the Chinese government (Li 2012, x)
Likewise, an historian of the Chinese tobacco industry argues that “a major
barrier to effective tobacco control in China remains the significant economic
clout wielded by China’s highly profitable tobacco industry (Benedict 2011, 253).
With these political and economic factors in mind, how should one expect
the government to regulate e-cigarettes? One option might be to reign in the
proliferation of private e-cigarette manufacturers by including them in the state
e-cigarette monopoly, enabling the government to capture revenue generated by
the e-cigarette business. Another approach might be to protect the combustible
tobacco industry by prohibiting e-cigarettes. A third option could involve
regulating e-cigarettes as tobacco products, but allowing private e-cigarette
enterprises to operate. Faced with these and perhaps other regulatory options,
the government has so far taken no action; it does not regulate e-cigarettes as

medical devices, dangerous chemicals, pharmaceutical products, or tobacco
products. No government agency has been tasked with the regulation of ecigarettes, and those agencies that could plausibility take the reins—the Ministry
of Health, the CNTC, the State Administration of Work Safety, the State
Administration for Industry and Commerce, the State Food and Drug
Administration—have each disclaimed responsibility (Feldman and Yue 2016).
What one finds in China, therefore, is an e-cigarette market unburdened by
regulation, at least until the government determines that some form of regulation
is politically and economically advantageous.25
It is no surprise that political pressures, financial interests, and institutional
arrangements play an important role in determining how policies are shaped,
which policies are adopted, and how vigorously policies are enforced. When the
stakes are high, the influence of such factors can be particularly acute. Tobacco
policy is one such area: the financial interests of parties as diverse as
multinational corporations and individual farmers are strong; the political stakes
are considerable; and a wide array of institutional actors have skin in the game.
What is true for tobacco turns out to be true for e-cigarettes, with many of the
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At this point, the most likely scenario was presented in an article by Li Baojiang, deputy director of the STMA,
who told China Daily: "Regulating e-cigarettes, like traditional tobacco products under the State monopoly, is
highly feasible. And that helps with consumer safety and rights, product quality control and the government
coffers."

same players involved in tobacco regulation staking out positions regarding ecigarette regulation. The different goals and interests of those players help to
explain the divergent approaches to e-cigarette regulation the US, Japan, and
China.

E-CIGARETTES AND THE COURTS
In addition to the absence of scientific consensus and the influence of
political and economic interests, the role of courts in the policymaking process
also helps to explain divergent e-cigarette policies in the US, Japan, and China.
Perhaps not surprisingly, there is only one jurisdiction in which the courts have
powerfully influenced e-cigarette policy—the United States. In neither Japan nor
China have the courts played even a minor role in determining if, or how, the
government should regulate e-cigarettes. In the US, however, courts have been a
central actor, arguably the central actor, in the evolving debate over e-cigarette
regulation.
Between late 2008 and early 2009, as the e-cigarette business was taking
off in the US, the FDA detained a series of e-cigarette shipments at Los Angeles
International Airport and ordered the importers to destroy or export their wares
(Feldman 2014). The FDA claimed that the importers were violating the Food,

Drug, and Cosmetic Act; in the agency’s view, e-cigarettes were combination
drugs/drug delivery devices that required FDA evaluation for safety and efficacy
(21 U.S.C. § 360d (1938)). Not surprisingly, the merchants held a different view.
Their products should not be regulated as drugs, they argued, because they had
not made any representations about their impact on health, a fundamental
aspect of the legal definition of a drug. Seeking legal relief, the importers filed a
claim in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in what is
now known as Smoking Everywhere vs. FDA (Smoking Everywhere, Inc. v. Food &
Drug Admin. 2010)).
The FDA’s position was complicated by two factors. One was that after a
century without the legal authority to regulate combustible tobacco products,
Representative Henry Waxman in 2009 introduced the Family Smoking Prevention
and Tobacco Control Act, which provided the FDA with the legal authority to
regulate certain combustible tobacco products (FDA 2018).26 Although regulating
tobacco had long been a goal of the FDA, the timing was inauspicious. Without
regulatory authority over tobacco, the FDA could potentially justify treating ecigarettes as pharmaceuticals. Once Congress gave it jurisdiction, regulating e-

26

See Tobacco Control Act, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/ucm298595.htm (last visited
Feb. 23, 2015) (describing how the Tobacco Control Act of 2009 gives the FDA broad authority to regulate the
manufacture, distribution, and marketing of tobacco products).

cigarettes as drugs/drug delivery devices became more difficult. Filing their
complaint to coincide with the passage of the Tobacco Control Act, plaintiff ecigarette corporations insisted that their products be regulated as tobacco, not
pharmaceuticals, since under the latter e-cigarettes would be subject to a lengthy,
costly, and potentially unsuccessful approval process.27
The second factor that complicated the FDA’s position was presiding judge
Richard Leon, who earlier in his career served as Republican chief counsel
investigating Whitewater (Smoking Everywhere, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin.
2010)). Described as “a conservative…who does not shrink from criticizing the
federal government on matters as varied as pornography, death penalty, drugs,
and terrorism suspects at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba,” Judge Leon’s general
antipathy toward government has also surfaced in a series of decisions involving
the FDA (Stolberg 2013). In three cases brought against the agency—e-cigarettes,
graphic warning labels on cigarette packets, and mentholated cigarettes—the
judge handed the FDA stinging defeats.
Judge Leon’s ruling in the Smoking Everywhere, affirmed on appeal, made a
relatively straightforward argument. If the FDA wants to regulate e-cigarettes, the

27

The FDA requires data on safety and efficacy before drugs can be sold, and e-cigarette manufactures have no
such data.

judge argued, it can do so. In the absence of claims that the products are being
sold as smoking cessation devices, however, it can only regulate them under the
Tobacco Control Act, not as pharmaceuticals. Judge Leon did not simply reject the
FDA’s regulatory approach; he also called into question the FDA’s motives.
This case appears to be yet another example of FDA’s aggressive efforts to
regulate recreational tobacco products as drugs or devices under the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). Ironically, notwithstanding that Congress
has now taken the unprecedented step of granting FDA jurisdiction over
those products, FDA remains undeterred. Unfortunately, its tenacious
drive to maximize its regulatory power has resulted in its advocacy of an
interpretation of the relevant law that I find, at first blush, to be
unreasonable and unacceptable (Smoking Everywhere, Inc. v. Food & Drug
Admin. 2010, 72, 78).
Reflecting on Sottera and other tobacco-related cases, Matthew L. Myers,
President of the Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, argues that Judge Leon “has
fundamentally altered FDA’s authority and ability to carry out its congressional
mandate (Levin 2014).”28 Indeed, in the absence of Sottera, the US would have
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Cases are randomly assigned, which meant that Judge Leon’s chance of being assigned all three was one in
1,859http://www.fairwarning.org/2014/09/fda-batting-o-3-federal-judge/.

been on the same regulatory path as Japan, with e-cigarettes effectively banned
until manufacturers could present evidence that they were safe and effective
nicotine replacement therapies. Instead, because of Judge Leon’s decision in
Smoking Everywhere, the FDA can only regulate e-cigarettes as tobacco products,
a long and arduous task that is still underway (FDA 2014).29
The Sottera case has exerted tremendous influence on US e-cigarette
policy. It denied the FDA’s efforts to apply drug regulation to e-cigarettes, and
instead made the new Tobacco Control Act the only plausible regulatory option.
Yet the fact that a complex policy choice was fundamentally shaped by the courts
is of little surprise in the US, where scholars have long acknowledged the role of
courts in the policymaking process (Kagan 2003.) The difference between the
influence of the courts on e-cigarette policy in the US and in Japan/China could
not be more vivid. In neither Japan nor China has there been any litigation over e–
cigarette policy; it is difficult even to imagine a legal challenge to the regulatory
authority of, for example, Japan’s Ministry of Finance over e-cigarettes, or of
China’s CNTC. Judicial policymaking is not the only explanation for the divergence
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To do so requires a number of time-consuming and difficult administrative maneuvers, which the FDA has been
pursing since April 2014.Food and Drug Administration, “Deeming Tobacco Products To Be Subject to the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as Amended by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act;
Regulations on the Sale and Distribution of Tobacco Products and Required Warning Statements for Tobacco
Products,” 79 FR 23141, April 25, 2014.

of e-cigarette regulations in the US, Japan, and China, but it is one important part
of the puzzle.

CONCLUSION
A paper on comparative e-cigarette regulation may not the obvious way to
pay homage to Malcolm Feeley. The topic does not speak to fundamental
tensions in criminal law and procedure for which Malcolm is so justly celebrated,
nor does it directly engage his interest in Federalism. Nonetheless, several aspects
of Malcolm’s work are critically important to how the paper is structured. First,
like so much of Malcolm’s work, the paper is explicitly comparative. Rather than
focus on e-cigarette regulation in a single jurisdiction, it looks across three
different nations so as to better analyze the range of factors that influence policy
in each of them. Second, Malcolm’s work often engages complex policy choices,
and analyzes the range of policy approaches available to state actors. This study
follows his example by exploring a thorny policy question—the regulation of ecigarettes—and examining a spectrum of policy approaches. Third, Malcolm’s
work is almost always concerned with the law in action, and demonstrates a deep
engagement with how legal rules and practices affect the populace, particular
marginalized populations. This paper indirectly reflects that concern; the use of

combustible tobacco has been increasingly relegated to those with lower incomes
and less education, and e-cigarette policy will undoubtedly have an impact on the
social gradient of smoking, though the details of that impact are not yet clear.
Those central aspects of Malcolm’s work motivate this paper. A
comparative analysis of e-cigarette policy reveals that three important
jurisdictions—the US, Japan, and China—have taken starkly different approaches
to the regulation of e-cigarettes. Divergence, not convergence, describes the
landscape of e-cigarette regulation, for three reasons; the unclear scientific and
epidemiological impact of e-cigarettes, the economic and political interests of key
actors, and the role of the courts. Although this paper underscores the particular
importance of those reasons, one can easily identify other possible explanations
that the paper leaves unexplored. Malcolm gets the final word: “I would hope
that the evidence and observations I present here will be tested against additional
information…Only if such collective work takes place can social science proceed
successfully (Feeley 1992, xxxiv.).”
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